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POLITICAL ISLAMISM IN TUNISIA: A HISTORY OF REPRESSION  
AND A COMPLEX FORUM FOR POTENTIAL CHANGE 
 
BY SARAH R LOUDEN  
 
ABSTRACT: This paper argues that the growth and legalization of Political 
Islamism in Tunisia will naturally hinder the contemporary influence of violent 
extremism, leading to partnership and inclusion within a Democratic government. 
The basis for this claim rests on the idea that the condemnation and repression of 
Political Islamism in Tunisia historically backfired and led to the further 
underground radicalization of Tunisians, along with scores of human rights abuses 
by authorities. Specifically, this essay will focus on the moderate Islamist party 
Ennahda, the Salafist party Ansar al-Sharia, and their complex relationship to each 
other as well as to domestic and regional politics at large. Furthermore, this essay 
will examine the wide continuum of Political Islamism at present, including the 
Tunisian government’s most recent agenda regarding its response to violent 
extremism, terrorism and acts of vigilante violence. This essay advocates for the 
Tunisian government to continue to allow the participation of Islamist groups 
within the political arena while maintaining security, transparency, and 
accountability for the state and its citizens.  
 
KEYWORDS: Tunisia, Arab Spring, Political Islamism, Ennahda, Salafism. 
 
SHORT TITLE: Political Islamism in Tunisia 
 
      
     Tunisia, located in the heart of what is known geographically as the Maghreb 
region of North Africa, witnessed a successful overthrow of its president Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali and his oppressive regime in January of 2011. The uprisings that 
prompted Ben Ali’s removal quickly became attributed to a larger public 
mobilization in the Middle East known as “The Arab Spring.” Tunisia’s recent 
transitional government – the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) – was 
watched closely not only by the residents of Tunisia, but also by the international 
community at large. The NCA, which governed from 2011-2014, included a 
majority block of popularly elected Islamist politicians – who for the first time in 
Tunisia’s history as an independent state were given the legal right to participate 
in its government. Political Islamism, although frowned upon by much of the 
Western world out of fear regarding its ties to religious violence, may indeed 
prosper in post-revolutionary Tunisia. This paper argues that the growth and 
legalization of Political Islamism in Tunisia will naturally hinder the 
contemporary influence of violent extremism, leading to partnership and inclusion 
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within a Democratic government. The basis for this claim rests on the idea that 
the condemnation of Political Islamism in Tunisia historically backfired and led to 
the further underground radicalization of Tunisians, along with scores of human 
rights abuses by authorities. Scholar John Turner regards the theory allowing 
Islamist parties to participate openly in Tunisian politics as not only a “cure, but 
rather a beginning to a possibility” of democratic growth and sustainability within 
the Arab world.  This essay will analyze the different historical and contemporary 1
factors that provide evidence for the partnership of Islamism and Democracy. 
Specifically, this essay will focus on the moderate Islamist party Ennahda, the 
Salafist party Ansar al-Sharia, and their complex relationship to each other as well 
as to Tunisian politics at large.  Furthermore, this essay will examine the wide 2
continuum of Political Islamism at present, including the Tunisian government’s 
most recent agenda regarding its response to violent extremism.  
     In order for a democratic government to progress organically in Tunisia, as 
well as elsewhere in the region, it is necessary for both the West as well as the 
Arab world to allow political Islamism to grow and advance. If this occurs, then 
political Islamism can work in cooperation with a democratic governing system, 
and benefit politicians and citizens alike. Indeed, “of all the developments that 
have impacted on the politics of the Maghreb states in the post-independence 
area, none has equaled that of Islamism.”  Throughout Tunisia’s independence, 3
Islamist movements witnessed various cycles by the country’s dominating 
regimes and were seen as a necessary “counterweight to the radical left” 
opposition.  However, whenever a party spoke out or amassed a large following, 4
it was immediately seen as a threat by the regime, and a brutal crackdown ensued. 
This cycle seemingly came to a halt after Tunisia’s recent uprising in 2011 – when 
Tunisia’s moderate Islamist party Ennahda gained a majority vote in the state and 
took power in the transitional government’s NCA. Ennahda led the NCA from 
November 2011 though January 2014, before an interim independent government 
took over to lead the state until its late 2014 elections. While the majority leader 
of the NCA, Ennahda formed a coalition government with two non-Islamist 
parties – the Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol. However, since 2011 the 
Tunisian government continues to grapple with divisions among its elected 
parties, as well as outlying parties including Salafists – some of whom the 
 Turner, John. "Untangling Islamism from Jihadism: Opportunities for Islam and the West after 1
the Arab Spring." Arab Studies Quarterly 34.3 (2012): 185. Pluto Journals.
 Due to the variations in transliteration spellings, the spellings of multiple proper nouns in Arabic 2
– such as Ennahda – have been accordingly adjusted in English to correlate in spelling for the 
paper’s cohesiveness. 
 Willis, Michael. Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from 3
Independence to the Arab Spring., (New York: Columbia UP, 2012), 155.
 Ibid., 156.4
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government labels as violent extremists or jihadists. As Ennahda struggles to 
maintain popularity and promote its democratic ideals, it must also resist the past 
errors of Tunisian regimes; while maintaining a safe and transparent political 
platform, the Tunisian government must continue to allow more conservative 
Islamist groups into the political arena, so long as they do not pose a threat to the 
dissolution of the state’s democratic stability. Thus, it is necessary to provide free 
and fair elections where a variety of opinions can be heard and judged openly by 
the state’s residents – and not to preemptively ban political parties purely out of 
oppositional fear.  
 
THE BASIS FOR AN ISLAMIST SOCIETY  
      
The region known as the Maghreb encompasses the North African states of 
Mauritania, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Specifically in Morocco, 
Algeria, and Tunisia, Islamism has come to represent the main opposition force, 
and thereby constitutes the “most significant political challenge” that each state 
has grappled with during post-colonialism.  Why then, does an Islamic society 5
appeal to so many Tunisians? For many, Islamism “offers voters a strong vision of 
a just society.”  In addition to attracting religious followers, Islamist parties 6
emphasize family values, social conservatism, charitable work and community 
service – which attract supporters from various classes, regions, and educational 
levels. Moreover, as Noueihed emphasizes, a vote for an Islamist party is not 
necessarily seen by the voter as a direct vote for religion, but instead as a vote to 
reject past despotism and authoritarian regimes.  While Tunisia recovers from its 7
prior dictatorship, it is evident that the majority of its population actively fears 
this kind of authoritarian takeover once again. Therefore, Tunisians are eager to 
promote a system of checks and balances within their new government. According 
to scholar Mehdi Mabrouk, the drift towards religious extremism in the state is in 
fact a “product of the tense and often conflictual relationship between political 
Islam and the Tunisian regime.”  In order to understand the history of modern 8
political Islamism, it is necessary to understand the context in which Islamism 
emerged in Tunisia, as well as its influence from regional Gulf States. While many 
scholars with an Orientalist perspective may label Islamism largely as a reaction 
to colonialism or foreign occupation, more contemporary scholars, such as Willis, 
 Willis, 155.5
 Noueihed, Lin and Alex Warren. The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counterrevolution 6
and the Making of a New Era., (New Haven: Yale UP, 2013), 270.
 Ibid., 271.7
 Mabrouk, Mehdi, “Tunisia: The Radicalization of Religious Policy,” in Islamist Radicalisation in 8
North Africa: Politics and Process, ed. George Joffé (New York: Routledge 2012), 49. 
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Mabrouk, and Turner argue that the mass appeal of Political Islamism – in its 
various forms – is rather a result of Tunisia’s past (and to a certain extent its 
ongoing) internal repression of Islam in the political and public realms.   9
 
THE SPECTRUM OF POLITICAL ISLAMISM  
     
Although Western countries and their contemporary Middle Eastern allies have 
consciously attempted to limit the role of religion in politics, this is a tactic that 
proves itself to be methodically challenging in the Middle East — where Islam is 
such an integrated part of many cultures.  Within Tunisia, as well as in other 10
states in the region, true diversity within political Islamism exists. Political 
Islamism, as defined by Noueihed, is a movement that “views Islam as a 
framework for political and social action and rule, not just personal conduct or 
spiritual belief.”  Moreover, within Political Islamism, a spectrum of levels of 11
observance exists. While some followers, such as Salafists, may hold puritanical 
views that date back to the practices of early historical Muslims, others support 
the idea of a moderate Islamic State – where Islam influences the law, but does 
not literally dictate it. Noueihed notes that these moderate Islamists are “flexible 
and dynamic,” and “view Islam as constantly evolving and renewing to move 
with the times.”  Political Islam is a term that can be used to refer to “attempts by 12
Muslim individuals, groups, and movements to reconstruct the political, 
economic, social, and cultural basis of their society along Islamic lines.”  13
Salafism is a conservative offshoot of Islam that is continuing to gain momentum 
in Tunisia. Although Salafism in Tunisia did not appear widely or publicly until 
after the 2011 revolution, the trends and ideas were growing underground from as 
early as the 1980s within the state.  Even within Salafism there is a spectrum of 14
belief. Self-proclaimed Salafists primarily believe in “returning to the 
fundamentals offered by the scriptures and in emulating the behavior and 
appearance of the earliest Muslims, known as al-salaf al-salih, or the righteous 
predecessors.”  Most Salafists believe that a modern Islamic state should still 15
 In this instance, the term “Orientalist” refers to the ideology in Edward Said’s 1978 book 9
Orientalism – specifically referencing someone with an exclusively Euro-centric or Western 
viewpoint. 
 Turner, 178.10
 Noueihed, 264-5.11
 Ibid., 265.12
 Esposito, John L., and Emad El-Din Shahin “Introduction,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islam 13
and Politics, ed. Esposito, John L., and Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford UP, 2013), 1. 
 Marks, Monica. “Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current.” 14
Mediterranean Politics 18:1 (2013): 107. Web. 
 Noueihed, 267.15
4
Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Multidisciplinary Studies, Vol. 4 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://ir.uiowa.edu/mathal/vol4/iss1/2
DOI: 10.17077/2168-538X.1060
follow strict Sharia law; however, followers of Salafism differ on their beliefs of 
how one should go about accomplishing this.  
      Many critical contemporary scholars “portray neo-imperialist foreign policy 
practices and the legacy of colonialism as the root cause of the rise of Salafi 
Jihadism.”  However, scholar John Turner argues against this Orientalist 16
rationalization as the only underlying factor in the recent rise of Islamic violence. 
He goes on to argue that “a deeper investigation into the phenomenon of Salafi 
Jihadism that does not simply understand Middle Eastern affairs as an extension 
of Western policy, but as an entity in its own right” is in order.  Thus, Turner is 17
among a group of scholars who believe that the rise of violent extremism in the 
Middle East is due primarily to the region’s exclusion of religion from politics.  
     Recent popular support for Salafist groups in the Maghreb region has given 
Salafists an increased visibility – both on a domestic and national scale. In 
response, citizens within Tunisia who identify as non-traditional or secularist in 
their political views are continuing to vocalize their fear that Salafists who gain 
power may attempt to impose strict religious law upon all citizens.  Some 18
modern Salafists follow the teachings and beliefs of Islamic reformist Muhammad 
Rashid Rida (d. 1935). Unlike his predecessor Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), 
Rida acutely rejected Islam’s merging with modernism as well as any reliance on 
Western ideology. During the 1920s, Rida defended the position that “Islamic 
legal reform required an Islamic government – namely, the restoration of the 
caliphate.”  He believed that the restoration of the caliphate would be superior to 19
Western democracy. Rida’s increasingly conservative views continued until his 
death; he ultimately supported the idea that the “fundamental sources of Islam,” 
such as Sharia, “provided a complete code for life.”  Rida’s contemporary 20
followers interpret the use of the word salaf in a restrictive manner. According to 
Rida’s literal translation of the term, it may only be used to refer to the first, pious 
generation of Muslims.  Moreover, “while ‘Abduh had advocated a general spirit 21
of intellectual rejuvenation inspired by the Prophet’s early companions, Rida later 
tended toward a constrained normativity based exclusively on the Qur’an and the 
traditions of the Prophet and his companions.”  Thus, many contemporary 22
scholars may trace the current Salafist movement to Rida’s work in the early 
 Turner, 178.16
 Ibid., 177-8.17
 Muasher, Marwan. The Second Arab Awakening and the Battle for Pluralism. (New Haven, CT: 18
Yale UP, 2014), 47. 
 Saeed, Abdullah “Salafiya, Modernism, and Revival,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islam and 19
Politics, ed. Esposito, John L., and Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford UP 2013), 34-5. 
 Ibid., 35.20
 Ibid., 36.21
 Ibid.22
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1900s. However, debate also exists that Salafism’s ideological roots may be traced 
as far back as the medieval period.  
 
A STATE-WIDE CRACKDOWN UNDER BOURGUIBA AND BEN ALI  
     
Following Tunisia’s post-colonial independence in 1956, political Islamism was 
seen as a threat to the government and thus the Bourguiba regime used it as an 
excuse to rashly “justify and legitimize policies” in the state, often in the name of 
reformation, modernization, anti-terrorism.  “Acting simultaneously as both a 23
cultural initiator and engineer, the Tunisian state sought to reduce the universalist 
dimensions of Islam horizontally and vertically.”  Such examples include the 24
dismantling of religious institutions such as the Zaytouna Mosque under 
Bourguiba’s rule.  In addition, the 1958 educational reforms ended a thousand-25
years of tradition of public religious education and teaching within Tunisia.  This 26
mandate in effect allowed the Bourguiba regime to control the public sphere of 
religion. Overall, these reforms symbolized a vital turning point in the devastation 
of traditional Islam in the state. The reforms led to the regime’s “administrative 
monopolization of Islam,” and furthermore included “the termination of religious 
endowments, the abolition of Qur’anic schools as well as the legal prohibition of 
any activity in mosques other than prayer. Even religious instruction was subject 
to prior administrative sanction.”  Bourguiba’s “forceful modernization policies 27
irked the then most dormant religious reformist current in Tunisia.”  These 28
policies likely influenced formerly moderate Muslims into political – and 
sometimes violent – action, because they felt that their religion was being both 
controlled and limited by the ruling regime. Thereby, “the Tunisian religious 
movement, which was initially concerned with cultural, social, and religious 
issues, inched its way into the political arena, expressing opposition to the left and 
later to the increasingly authoritarian state under Bourguiba.”   29
     Upon Ben Ali’s swift rise to presidency in 1989, thousands of imprisoned 
Islamist Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI) activists were released, and 
 Willis, 157.23
 Mabrouk, 50.24
 Historically, the Zaytouna mosque holds a significant affiliation with MTI – Mouvement de la 25
Tendance Islamique – the Islamist party’s roots were planted by individuals associated with the 
mosque, who, with a foundation of young students, formed a group that would go on to transform 
into the Islamist party Ennahda. 
 Mabrouk, 51.26
 Ibid., 52.27
 Layachi, Azzedine. “Islam and Politics in North Africa,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islam and 28
Politics, ed. Esposito, John L., and Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford UP 2013), 360.
 Ibid., 361.29
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hopes for a legitimate multi-party system in Tunisia again seemed probable. 
Rachid Ghannouchi – one of MTI’s founders – and other MTI members continued 
to make concessions in hopes of gaining acceptance by Ben Ali. Most notably, the 
party renamed itself in 1989 as Ennahda (Arabic for "renaissance"), with the hope 
that by toning down its reference to Islam, the party could seek formal recognition 
by the government.  Despite Tunisia’s presidential change, relations between 30
Islamism and the ruling regime continued to regress. During Ben Ali’s political 
crackdown after the 1989 elections, Ennahda party members suffered repression 
due to their confrontational approach to Tunisian politics. During this period, 
Ennahda openly accused Tunisian authorities of electoral fraud, and thereafter 
saw thousands of its members arrested and often brutally tortured behind prison 
doors.  Ennahda furthermore “accused the government of blocking the 31
emergence of a democracy in Tunisia by excluding Islamists from its 
conceptualization of pluralism.”  The level of confrontation with the state 32
continued to intensify. 
      Throughout the early 1990s, Ennahda made official statements condemning 
the use of violence. However, incidents involving party members – including a 
supposed plot to overthrow the regime – provoked Ben Ali’s government to arrest 
upwards of 8,000 Ennahda party members between 1991 and 1992.  Overall, the 33
political opposition gained such momentum in Tunisia, that the ruling regime 
could see “no way of coping with its Islamic opponents other than by crushing 
them.”   34
     In an attempt to yet again “religiously cleanse” Tunisia in the early 1990s, 
Ali’s regime adopted a policy to “target the ‘sources’ which…fertilized political 
Islam.”  The new program targeted books, school programs, newspapers, and 35
mass media. This “pedagogical purification” went on to include measures that 
abused the fundamental human rights of Tunisians – such as banning traditional 
head-shawls and the growing of a beard. However, the de-Islamization process 
adopted by Tunisia did not rid the state of Political Islamism as intended, but 
rather had a reverse effect. As explained by Willis: It “encouraged the blossoming 
of radical Salafism. This was the real and perverse consequence of the cruel and 
violent cleansing process. The disappearance of Ennahda from the political scene 
 Willis, 167.30
 Ibid., 134.31
 Perkins, Kenneth. "Playing the Islamic Card: The Use and Abuse of Religion in Tunisian 32
Politics." The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects. (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh UP, 2013), 70.
 Wills, 168.33
 Perkins, 73.34
 Mabrouk, 57.35
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created an ideal opportunity for this alternative radical culture to propagate 
itself.”  The government’s intolerance of Political Islamism and repression of 36
public expression of religion drove any remaining Islamist groups underground, 
and often spurred animosity in the process. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, “the 
organizational machinery concerned with the recruiting of sympathizers who 
could have become Ennahda members has been effectively paralyzed and has, in 
consequence, yielded to jihadist networks which have been able to appropriate the 
space left vacant by Ennahda members.”  This opinion supports the claim that 37
the Tunisian government’s continued repression towards Islam in the political – as 
well as the public – sectors, essentially backfired and thereby created a new and 
more extreme sect of Islamism.  
 
THE EFFECTS OF 9/11 ON TUNISIAN POLITICS  
      
Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11th 2001, Ben 
Ali’s regime brought its anti-Islamist policies to a new level of corruption. The 
regime used the tactic of fear – specifically fear caused by Islamism – in order to 
manipulate public opinion and Ben Ali frequently used the threat of Islamist 
extremism to support his own political agenda and justify his regime’s 
authoritarian rule.  “On the pretext of struggling against religious 38
fundamentalism and terrorism…the dictatorship progressively and methodically 
succeeded in crushing any political, individual, or organized opposition and in 
reducing all media to silence.”  Moreover, systematic torture became widespread 39
in Tunisia after 9/11, when a hastily created anti-terrorism law was enacted. The 
vague policies put in place under the name of “anti-terrorism” removed regime 
and government personnel of any accountability. Ultimately, the law became a 
“suppressive security policy” that “ended up creating a political vacuum and 
closed any space for debate,” whereby further repression and media censorship 
followed.  Moreover, the attacks gave Ben Ali’s regime the opportunity to 40
portray itself to Western allies as a “seasoned bulwark against the threat of 
Islamist extremism.”  Under the gaze of Ben Ali’s regime, suspected terrorists 41
during the 1990s and 2000s in Tunisia could be virtually any of the hundreds of 
 Ibid., 60.36
 Ibid., 60-1.37
 Arieff, Alexis. “Political Transition in Tunisia.” Rep. no. 7-5700. N.p.: CRS Report for 38
Congress, 2011. Print, 16.
 Ayeb, Habib. "Social and Political Geography of the Tunisian Revolution: The Alfa Grass 39
Revolution." Review of African Political Economy 38.129 (2011): 469. Print.
 Ibid.40
 Willis, 191.41
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thousands of young Muslim men in the country; such a suspect could be picked 
up on his way to Mosque one day and systematically tortured in police custody 
under the guise of anti-terrorism, due entirely to his appearance or moderate 
religious practices.  These policies remained largely in place throughout the next 42
decade, and only now, in the aftermath of Tunisia’s uprisings, is the political arena 
gradually progressing towards a more inclusive body of representation. 
 
ENNAHDA’S RISE TO MAJORITY OPPOSITION PARTY  
      
Although political Islamism was not a definitive force behind the 2011 
demonstrations in Tunisia, the political Islamist movement Ennahda nonetheless 
amassed a substantial following during the years since the ouster of Ben Ali. How 
exactly did Ennahda turn into Tunisia’s most prominent opposition party? 
Ennahda built its reputation primarily as an “uncompromising opposition 
movement” during the Ben Ali era.  Although the party was illegal for years at a 43
time, strong underground, imprisoned, and exiled movements persisted.  44
Moreover, “many younger people with no connection to historical Ennahda joined 
after Ben Ali fled the country, bringing their own interpretations of what it means 
to work for and support an Islamist political project.”  Tunisia’s “new identity 45
model” is both a “rejection of Bourguiba’s, which excluded Islam from public 
life…and the Ben Ali regime, which seemed to celebrate conspicuous 
consumption and corruption in the name of progress.”  Thereby, Ennahda’s 46
recent political success can be attributed not merely to the party’s policy 
statements or past agenda, but rather due to the fact that the party’s ideals and 
intentions most closely realize those of the voters, and reject the ideologies of the 
state’s previous two regimes. 
     The October 2011 elections were Tunisia’s first  “free and transparent” since 
the state’s independence in 1956. Tunisians elected 217 members for a transitional 
Constituent Assembly. The results of Tunisia’s election were surprising to both 
Tunisians as well as to the international community – Ennahda received 41.7 
 Ayeb, 479.42
 Hostrup Haugbølle, Rikke, and Francesco Cavatorta. "Beyond Ghannouchi: Islamism and 43
Social Change in Tunisia." Middle East Report 42, 1.262 (2012): 20. Web.
 During its time leading the NCA, Ennahda faced ongoing internal divisions. Many of these 44
divisions may be traced back to the Ben Ali era, when core members of the group were imprisoned 
for extended periods, and many, including leader Rachid Ghanouchi, sought exile in Arab and 
Western countries. The Ennahda members who left Tunisia during this time of repression, returned 
following the Arab Spring, and were accused by purist and traditional Islamists of having adopted 
a more Westernized ideology while away. While leading the NCA, these internal divisions within 
Ennahda became more obvious. 
 Hostrup Haugbølle et al, 20.45
 Ibid.46
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percent of the vote and thereby won 89 seats in the Assembly, making it the 
majority party. However, many Tunisians, from both secularist and Islamist 
backgrounds remained skeptical of the party’s intentions. Today, Ennahda 
continues to criticize the use of violence and Islamic militancy. Ghannouchi’s 
vocal criticism of violence in both Islamism and politics, together with his 
seemingly pro-liberalist attitude “led some Islamists to question his attachment 
not just to [Political] Islamism, but to Islam itself.”  Distrust in Islamist parties 47
among secularists and leftists remains prevalent. Many Tunisians are decisively 
critical of the elected officials from Ennahda. Major fear and concern surround the 
scenario of what will transpire when Ennahda or other Islamic parties lose their 
public support; some Tunisians worry the ruling parties will not step down 
quietly.  
 
A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAMIST PARTIES  
       
A tense and complex relationship between Ennahda and various Salafist parties, 
most notably Ansar al-Sharia (AST), continues to exist. AST was founded on the 
ideology of international jihadism. The origins of the group dates back at least as 
far as 2006, when political prisoners detained under Ben Ali converged. 
Following the 2011 revolution, these prisoners were freed under a general 
amnesty policy, and the group evolved into its present form as a Salafist 
organization.  Following the recent uprising in Tunisia, various Islamist parties 48
attempted to receive recognition and legalization from the state’s interim 
government. Some of these groups continue to be labeled as “extremist,” as well 
as “militant” by the government and news media. Although Ennahda initially 
supported legalization for many of these opposing parties during 2011-2012, the 
last two years proved tumultuous in regards to Ennahda’s popularity and 
reputation – as well as to the party’s relationship to Salafists.   
     Until recently, Ennahda viewed the inclusion of Salafist parties as a vital step 
towards a comprehensive democratic government. Cavatorta outlines Ennahda’s 
agenda regarding Salafism as the following:  
 
First, there is a degree of understanding of the radical positions of the Salafists. Many Ennahda 
members used to hold similar views in the past and have come around to different methods and 
policies rather recently. Second, the inclusion of Salafists in the political games might benefit 
Ennahda electorally, given that the radicalism of Salafists would be neutered; having joined the 
 Willis, 191.47
 Merone, Fabio. "One Last Chance for Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia." Tunisia-live.net. N.p., 30 48
Aug. 2013. Web. 17 Apr. 2014;  
    Zelin, Aaron Y. “Tunisia, Uncovering Ansar al-Sharia.” Think Africa Press. N.p., 25 Oct. 2013. 
Web. 04 March 2013.
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political system, Salafists would no longer seem so radical. Finally, Ennahda can use Salafists to 
provide a more moderate image of itself, arguing that it is defending democracy and human rights 
by acting as a rampart against Salafism.   49
 
Furthermore, Ennahda worries that banning Salafist groups, such as AST, will 
merely push the movements further towards violence. Instead, Ennahda – and 
other moderate Islamist movements – initially encouraged Salafist groups to 
engage in the democratic arena.  Formally recognized Salafi parties continue to 50
lack popular support, especially among younger, more radical Tunisians, who may 
view the parties as a “contradiction in terms,” and “vehemently reject…the 
institutionalization of party politics.”  While leading the NCA, Ennahda 51
continued to face criticism and skepticism in regards to its relationship to – and 
tolerance of – Salafist parties. Opponents accused Ennahda of failing to take a 
hard public stance against Salafi groups suspected of committing violent attacks.        
      Although rising numbers of Salafi parties were initially welcomed to Tunisia’s 
new political forum, the parties have since become a growing – and often violent 
– challenge for Ennahda and Tunisia’s government at large. “At the very least, 
Tunisian secularists and liberals believe Ennahda has failed to identify and punish 
Salafi groups or individuals who have violently attacked activists and 
intellectuals.”  Vocal opponents of Ennahda may go so far as to accuse the party 52
of actively engaging in “double-talk – assuring the Tunisian and international 
communities of its moderate outlook, but using Salafis and their bursts of violence 
to further Islamic influence in government institutions.”  Some opposition groups 53
went so far as to call for Ennahda to step down, as well as for the dissolution of 
the NCA. Once again, Ennahda conceded to these demands and peacefully 
stepped down.   Opponents argue that Ennahda, in an effort to appeal to a wider 	
54
 Cavatorta, Francesco, Fabio Merone, and Stefano M. Torelli. "Salafism in Tunisia: Challenges 49
and Opportunities for Democratization." Middle East Policy 19.4 (2012): n.p. Print.
 A couple of other, smaller Salafi organizations – Jibhat al-Islah, Hizb al-Asala, and Hizb al-50
Rahma – have become somewhat integrated into Tunisian politics and are considered legitimate 
political parties. However, their popular support remains much smaller than that of AST, and they 
are sometimes viewed disdainfully by hardliner Islamists, similar to the reputation Ennahda has 
gained in more traditional Islamist circles 
 Marks, 109. 51
 Muasher, 89-90.52
 Ibid.53
 During the end of September 2013, the Ennahda-led coalition government decided to step down 54
and hand over its power to “an independent caretaker government” that would remain in effect 
until Tunisia’s 2014 elections (Gall, Carlotta. “Islamist Party in Tunisia to Step Down.” The New 
York Times. N.p., 28 Sept. 2013. Web.
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Islamic base, did not take a firm enough stance against Salafism – specifically in 
connection to AST.    55
      Fabio Merone, a journalist for Tunisia-live.net and a prominent reporter and 
researcher on Salafism in Tunisia, sums up his thoughts pertaining to the current 
transitional government’s crackdown on Salafism in Tunisia. He states:  
 
Government officials need to address Tunisia’s security challenges, but without shutting out 
religious groups who could still turn out to be peaceful. A nuanced security policy meant to 
distinguish between Tunisia’s enemies and devout masses is needed to prevent escalation and 
ensure stability.  56
 
Moreover, Merone describes AST as a group predominantly comprised of young, 
working-class Muslims. The political party is “rooted in the disenfranchised 
neighborhoods of the country. A mix of social marginalization and loss of hope 
brought many to join its ranks.”  Despite recent theories and accusations that 57
AST maintains an “armed wing” and preaches violence, Merone argues that Ansar 
al-Sharia instead supports jihad (literally – “struggle”) solely through peaceful 
means – such as proselytizing, preaching, and organized charity (dawa). The 
party’s rhetoric is founded on the Prophet Muhammad’s strong concept of 
patience. Although this may be true in concern to the group’s official agenda, 
skepticism abounds concerning AST’s clandestine structure. There continues to be 
speculation over AST’s budget, and where its resources (both monetary and 
written) come from. Aaron Zelin, among others, claims that much of AST’s 
literature (which is often criticized by opponents as propaganda) is published in 
Saudi Arabia, and is likely donated to the organization. Additionally, much of 
AST’s food and medicinal provisions appear to be donated by a Kuwaiti Salafi 
charity.  Zelin also attributes funding for new Salafist-supported mosques in 58
Tunisia as being imported from Gulf countries, though concrete proof is difficult 
to come by.  Regional instability continues to affect Tunisia, allowing for the 59
influx of ideologies and outsiders’ influential agendas. Gulf countries, specifically  !
 Ryan, Yasmine. "Rifts Threaten Tunisia’s Governing Party." Al Jazeera. N.p., 28 Aug. 2013. 55
Web. 06 Mar. 2014.
 Merone, Fabio. "Ansar al-Sharia and the War Against Terrorism." Tunisia-live. N.p., 10 Mar. 56
2014. Web. 17 Apr. 2014.
 Ibid.57
 Zelin, Aaron Y. "Meeting Tunisia's Ansar al-Sharia." Foreign Policy. N.p., 08 March 2013. Web. 58
06 March 2015.
  Gartenstein-Ross confirms these claims, noting that AST has received medical supplies from a 59
Kuwaiti charity known as RIHS (the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society), and further goes on to 
trace AST’s literature handouts and pamphlets to at least three publishing houses in Saudi Arabia 
(Gartenstein-Ross, “Ansar al-Sharia”). 
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Saudi Arabia, continue to seek political influence in Tunisia, while rumors of 
Qatari petrodollars financing Ennahda continue to circulate as well.  60
 
INTERMITTENT BOUTS OF VIOLENCE INTENSIFY FROM 2012 - PRESENT  
 
During the last few years, many young Salafists have taken advantage of the 
“general disorder and the emergence of lawless areas in order to advance Islamic 
law.”  This holds particularly true within Tunisia’s interior regions, where 61
poverty and unemployment are more widespread than in the state’s coastal areas. 
Prior to late 2012, most occurrences of Salafist violence and unrest have been 
“more dramatic than deadly,” with unruly protests and threats to Tunisia’s 
governing body, officials, and high-profile secular activists.  62
     Much of this violence should be considered to be vigilante Salafist violence, 
meaning it is not necessarily tied to, or carried out by, a specific group (such as 
AST). However, the perpetrators may often claim to associate with, or be active 
members of Salafist parties or organizations, which makes their actions more 
complicated. These acts of religiously motivated violence – which may include 
public beatings, aggressive protests, threats, or assassinations – predominately 
target women, secularists, social justice activists, artists, educators, foreigners, 
Sufis and other religious minorities, as well as more reform-minded Muslims and 
Imams.  However, the incidents that have received the most media attention have 63
been the assassinations of dominant secular politicians, and a violent incident at 
the U.S. embassy in Tunis on 14 of September 2012. Following the violent 
protests at the U.S. embassy where two deaths occurred, the Ennahda-led 
government finally took a firm stance by conducting “sweeping arrests” of 
Salafists, primarily self-proclaimed members of AST.  This massive and sudden 64
series of arrests involved detainment of nearly 200 suspected Salafists on 
“vaguely substantiated charges,” and ended up resulting in a hunger strike among 
prisoners, whereby two detainees died.    65
      	

 Awad, Mokhtar, Peter Juul, Brian Katulis, and Hardin Lang. Center for American Progress, 60
"Tunisia's Struggle for Political Pluralism After Ennahda." (April 2014), 8. 
 Crisis Group, "Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge: Middle East and North Africa Report 61
No. 13713." N.p., 13 Feb. 2013. Web. 6 March 2015.
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 Gartenstein-Ross, “Ansar al-Sharia.”63
 Although it is unclear if AST acted exclusively as the leader of the Embassy attack, there is 64
evidence that the group “played a major role” in the organization of protests, and the clashes with 
security forced that escalated into violence. According to eyewitnesses, AST protestors initiated 
the violence against security that premeditated an attack on the embassy (Gartenstein-Ross et al).
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     Although recent violence at the Algerian border dates back to a Tunisian 
military officer’s death by a militant in December 2012, tensions escalated over 
the next few months. May, 2013 marks the period when Tunisia’s government 
began to clamp down on Salafists – specifically AST members. That month, a 
bloody skirmish broke out involving Tunisian security forces and a jihadist group 
called Katibat Uqbah Ibn Nafi, whose members are comprised of Algerian, 
Tunisian, and Libyan nationals. The incident took place around the Jebel Chambi 
Mountain on Tunisia and Algeria’s border. Tunisian forces allegedly attacked the 
area with heavy artillery in order to uncover jihadist-training camps. The security 
operation lasted approximately two weeks, and both sides endured heavy injuries, 
with five Tunisian soldiers reportedly requiring limb amputations after the event 
due to the presence of improvised explosive devices. Just two months later, in 
July, yet another attack occurred in the Jebel Chambi region, this time militants 
killed eight Tunisian soldiers – five of whom had their throats slit.  Although the 66
Tunisia government linked AST to the violence at Jebel Chambi, AST’s leaders 
deny these accusations and have not sought recognition for the aforementioned 
attacks.  
     Moreover, two high-profile political assassinations in 2013 caused a major 
blow to the public’s confidence in its government. On February 6, 2013, secularist 
politician Chokri Belaïd was shot and killed. Directly following the murder, 
Tunisia witnessed a massive eruption as one million outraged and grieving 
citizens took to the streets in protest. Much of their anger and grief was directed at 
the ruling Ennahda government, believing the party was too “soft” on Salafists 
and violent Islamists, and that enough precaution wasn’t taken to prevent the 
murder. Approximately six months later, on July 25, Mohammed Brahmi  – 
another secularist politician – was murdered. More protests broke out across the 
state, including angry calls from protesters demanding the government’s 
resignation. In response, the government went on to publicly link AST to both the 
assassinations, as well as the violent attacks at Jebel Chaambi. On August 27, 
AST was formally labeled a terrorist organization. Many questions remain 
unanswered regarding the multiple bloody attacks. It seems likely that members 
of AST are linked to the murders, but there is less evidence that AST as a group 
formally ordered or organized the killings. Some critics of the government believe 
that the blame is being placed too quickly on a perpetrator (in this case, AST) in 
order to deflect blame from the government, and to maintain an illusion of 
security in the unstable state.  Conspiracy theories and blame linked to the 67
 Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, Bridget Moreng, and Kathleen Soucy. International Centre for 66
Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, "Raising the Stakes: Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia's Shift to 
Jihad."N.p., February 2014. Web. 06 March 2015.
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multiple violent murders in 2013 protruded in various directions. While some 
secularists blamed Ennahda outright for the assassinations, multiple members of 
Ennahda actually voiced concerns that members of the “old regime” manipulated 
or coerced Salafists to commit the acts of violence in order to emphasize the 
fragility and insecurity of the state.    68
     Since May of 2013, over 2,000 Salafis have been arrested for either direct or 
indirect involvement in various acts of violence.  Is the “hard-line” approach 69
working? Or is the Tunisian government continuing to disenfranchise its younger, 
struggling, more impressionable citizens and lose their support to extremist 
organizations? One of Tunisia’s ‘most wanted men,’ Ahmed Rouissi, was killed 
recently fighting for The Islamic State (referred to as both “ISIL” and “ISIS”). 
The Tunisian government believed he was involved in the 2013 political 
assassinations of Belaïd and Brahmi. As of yet, no one has been convicted for 
these murders, so it remains questionable what the mass arrests of Salafists from 
2013 - 2015 accomplished.  
 
YET ANOTHER CYCLE OF RELIGIOUS OPPRESSION?   
     
Tunisia’s recent crackdown on Salafism, including the branding of AST as an 
illegal terrorist organization, is extremely reminiscent of the state’s previous 
banning of MTI (and Ennahda) decades earlier – including the mass-arrests and 
broad accusations brought upon the party’s members. Rather than allowing the 
party to continue operating publicly with some degree of transparency, the 
government has instead pushed AST underground while thereby “encouraging 
small groups of radicalized people to move without a political guide.”  Although 70
splinter organizations with extremist members have been identified as threats to 
the state  - as well as to the security of secular and leftist Tunisian politicians – no 
evidence has yet been presented publicly to link the Salafist party Ansar al-Sharia 
to violent activity or state terrorism per se. While violent acts of extremism 
associated with both groups and individuals should be watched closely, attention 
should also be paid to the state’s police and security responses. Merone writes:  
 !
 Boukhars, Anouar. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "In the Crossfire: Islamists' 68
Travails in Tunisia." (Jan. 2014).  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We cannot settle the question [of Salafism or jihadism] by simply saying that these are ‘terrorist 
groups’ that have to be eliminated from society. More consciousness of the need to integrate these 
young people is needed, along with an open cultural debate: Islam must be discussed openly in 
order for it to evolve in Tunisia’s new democratic context.  71
 
Merone maintains, “There is no solution but accountability,” and goes on to 
emphasize that “the only way to overcome the crisis is to open up room for 
mediation that will allow the moderate camp within Ansar al-Sharia to develop a 
clear platform condemning violence in order to declare itself a legal 
organization.”  If this happens, then AST will be able to interact with 72
transparency within Tunisia’s future democratic government as well as its society.  
     During these recent years of vigilantism and violence, the government has 
frequently been accused of not taking a hard enough stance on Salafists, and the 
police and security forces within the state have repeatedly come under scrutiny for 
their lukewarm response and inaction, especially by the international Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) organization. In order to maintain safety and security in 
Tunisia, especially among its minorities and vulnerable citizens, the state must do 
more to train and support its police at a local and national level, while maintaining 
transparency rather than promoting mass arrests and incarcerations under the 
guise of “anti-terrorism,” as occurred in the two prior administrations. “In order to 
blunt the force of Salafi-associated unrest, the Tunisian government must adopt a 
transparent and consistent policy to enforce the rule of the law.”  73
 
CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENT SINCE LATE 2013  
 
The NCA finally approved Tunisia’s new constitution on January 25, 2014. In 
response to the finalization of the constitution, the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund released and approved significant funds for Tunisia’s new interim  
government.  Shortly thereafter, on March 5, President Marzouki lifted the 74
official state of emergency in Tunisia, which had been in effect since the 2011 
uprising.  
     The year 2014 marked Tunisia’s first free and open election for president since 
the state’s independence from France in 1956. The peaceful elections have been 
labeled a “landmark vote for democracy in the country where the Arab Spring was 
 Merone, "One Last Chance.”71
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born.”  The election involved both mudslinging by the top candidates and 75
polarization of “Islamists” versus “Secularists.” Essebsi’s Nidaa Tounes party is 
viewed by critics as a return to the former establishment of the Ben Ali regime, 
while opponent Moncef Marzouki’s Congress for the Republic party was labeled 
by Essebsi and his supporters as “Islamist” and “extremist,” despite the fact that 
the party self-identifies as a center-left secularist party, rather than an Islamist 
one.  Marzouki held the position of President during Tunisia’s interim 76
Constituent Assembly government from 2011-2014 (he was elected by the 
Assembly, rather than in an open public election). Although Marzouki is not a 
member of the Ennahda party, he worked with them during his recent time in 
office from 2011-2014. Tunisia’s 2014 parliamentary election results shocked 
many analysts – the Nidaa Tounes party defeated Ennahda to win 85 of 217 
legislature seats. The Nidaa Tounes party is made up of a combination of former 
Ben Ali regime figures as well as secular leftists politicians. Ennahda won 70 
seats, with the remaining seats distributed to multiple smaller parties. Although 
some Tunisians feared that once in power, Ennahda would not step down quietly, 
this proved to be inaccurate. Ennahda did not resist defeat and congratulated 
Nidaa Tounes following the announcement of the election results. While Nidaa 
Tounes initially stood its ground in opposition to coalition building within the 
parliament, the party eventually accepted a unity government proposal that 
included members of Ennahda.  Overall, the voter turnout for the 2014 election  77
was only 67 and 60 percent for the presidential and legislative votes respectively, 
far lower than the 90 percent voter turnout following the revolution in 2011.   78
 
PROSPECTS FOR ESCALATION  
 
The violent attack at the Bardo Museum on the 18th of March 2015 targeted a 
symbolic venue – a national museum next to the Tunisian Parliament – as well as 
the state’s vital tourism industry. The majority of the attack’s 23 victims were 
 "Africa Research Bulletin 20387: Political, Social, and Cultural Series." Africa Research 75
Bulletin. no. 12 (2015): 20387A-20388B. 
 Ibid.76
 Dhaouadi, Rim, and Karina Piser. "Setback for Tunisia's Islamists portends a partisan political 77
turn." Al Jazeera America, N.p., 30 Oct. 2014. Web. 06 March 2015.
 The voter turnout for the 2014 presidential elections was lowest in Sidi Bouzid – at a turnout of 78
43.6%. This is significant, as Sidi Bouzid represents the starting point of the Arab Spring — where 
riots broke out after street vendor Mohammad Bouazizi self-immolated himself in protest against 
what he viewed as harassment and a lack of human dignity. The low voter turnout may be 
interpreted as a protest from residents of the interior Tunisian city who view the current 
government and major political parties as a far cry from what passionate Tunisians took to the 
streets for in 2011 — when protesters demanded an end to political corruption, cronyism, and 
repression. 
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foreign tourists. During the time of the attack, the Tunisian parliament reportedly 
met to discuss new anti-terrorism legislation that would affect police and military 
as well as “give the [state’s] security forces greater leeway to crack down on 
radicalization.”  Tunisian protestors continue to voice their dissatisfaction with 79
the current and previous administrations, placing the blame for the attack on the 
government. Although Ennahda previously opposed further anti-terrorism 
legislation, the party is now speaking up in support of the new anti-terrorism 
agenda.  
      With an estimated 3,000 Tunisians fighting abroad in Syria, Libya, Iraq and 
other MENA countries, it should not come as a surprise that previous followers 
and members of AST are now joining the more radical and violent groups waging 
war regionally, such as The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Jabhat al-
Nusra.  It seems that AST has provided a catalyst for violent Tunisian extremists 80
to connect with other regional Islamist groups – many of whom have much more 
violent agendas and are actively recruiting fighters. The day after the Bardo 
Museum attack, ISIL (also referred to as ISIS) claimed responsibility. The two 
gunmen responsible for the attack were killed at the scene, and nine further arrests 
were made shortly thereafter.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Both Ennahda, and the new ruling party Nidaa Tounes must form a productive 
unity government that restores justice and public confidence within the state. The 
new government must establish firm security policies while seeking a compromise 
between being seen as “soft” on or “sympathetic” to Salafists, and refrain from the 
manipulation of “anti-terrorism” laws in order to further its own political agenda 
or conduct sweeping, repressive arrests without the agency for fair, transparent 
trials. “To deal with the problem of radical Salafism, the Tunisian government has 
to undertake security sector reform and address the socioeconomic conditions that 
drive people toward extremist positions,” furthermore, the government must 
attempt to “restore state authority without falling into the traps of overreaction, 
abuse of human rights, and indiscriminate repression” which plagued the state 
during the past fifty years.  The root of vigilante violence and radicalization of 81
Tunisians appears to stem predominantly from socioeconomic conditions, rather 
than religion itself. Vulnerable individuals and communities may thereafter adopt 
 Lewis, Aidan. “Tunisia Museum Attack: ‘Arab Spring’ Pioneer Under Threat.” BBC News. N.p., 79
19 March 2015. Web.
 Walt, Vivienne. “Attack sharpens Tunisia’s dilemma over a crackdown on extremism.” Al 80
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radical political and religious beliefs and agendas as they feel they have been let 
down by their society and government. In order for a coalition or unity 
government to be successful it must strive to overcome the polarizing distinction 
between Islamists and secularists and instead work collaboratively to improve the 
lives of Tunisian citizens on multiple levels.      
     Despite the fact that Tunisia’s political transition was not flawless, it was 
indeed peaceful and transparent and will ideally set the stage for other regional 
neighbors to follow in the near future. Does the new government represent a 
return to the old regime? It is too soon to say, but the mere fact that the ruling 
government is inclusive of moderate Islamists and smaller independent parties is 
promising for the country’s future, which will hopefully be more open to dialogue 
regarding political and religious diversity. Democratic change in a formerly 
authoritarian nation will only emerge gradually – much like it has developed in 
other countries. In order for a new government to succeed, the West must accept 
the elected governing bodies as the genuine voice of the voters and citizens of 
each individual society. Moreover, while it is tempting to hold Tunisia and its 
neighboring post-revolutionary states up to unrealistic standards and ideals, it is 
vital to remember that long-established Western (and Eastern) countries have only 
reached democratic governments through centuries of racism, sexism, slavery, and 
genocide. As noted by scholar Noueihed, “A new political system can be installed 
in a short time, but social customs and prejudices are often much slower to 
change.”  Although it is crucial to allow a natural cycle of political triumphs and 82
failures to occur within a newly independent nation, it is also essential for 
Ennahda, Nidaa Tounes, and their coalition government to not automatically heed 
to media or international pressure against political parties that are attempting to 
participate in the state’s political arena. Within Tunisia’s current political 
landscape there remains hope that democratic principles will spread throughout 
the Middle East and that “violent Islamism will be dealt a heavy blow not by the 
West, but by the people of the Middle East themselves…Which form of political 
Islam comes to gain the strongest appeal in the future will depend in part on 
whether or not Political Islam is afforded a legitimate place in the governments of 
the future.”  Although it is difficult at this point in time to draw a concrete 83
conclusion pertaining to the future of Salafism – or political Islamism at large – in 
Tunisia’s political landscape, it is necessary to watch and indeed question the 
state’s treatment of all current political parties and Islamist movements.  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